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Think how hard physics would be if particles could think.
—Nobel laureate Murray Gell-Mann
Introduction
A change process is not and cannot be merely a rational pro-
cess. We, as human individuals, do not see ourselves as phys-
ical particles that follow nicely set-out trajectories when we 
are pushed to change or receive external impulses. Moreover, 
under these kinds of circumstances, we tend to do things 
more recursively and in cycles, moving along a lot but not 
seeming to function or operate in what is supposed to be the 
“right’” direction. The latter is the typical behavior, which 
most of us associate with resistance as a result of planned 
change programs in combination with typical top-down 
change initiatives. However, this kind of behavior is not 
exclusive to typical top-down planned change initiatives. We 
know that initial enthusiasm can be intense and widespread 
in participative change initiatives and that empowerment and 
a sense of ownership unlock lots of energy. However, as ear-
lier longitudinal research pointed out, under false colors, this 
can also be a certain recipe for enhancing inactive and cyni-
cal reactions (Sminia & Van Nistelrooij, 2006).
As practitioners of change, we know one or more exam-
ples in which solutions become problems. Recognizing that 
we—from time to time—seem to organize our way back-
ward and that the greater the efforts we invest in changing 
things for the better, the less we seem to achieve; most of the 
time, blaming it on the “resistance” of others. In addition, as 
scholars as well, we believe that a response to a change ini-
tiative can include reactions both positive and negative—
even both at the same time. This is what can be expected 
whenever two (or more) forces drive an individual in oppo-
site directions (Oreg & Sverdlik, 2011; Peters, 2012). Our 
purpose with this essay is to advocate a view that captures 
more this kind of ambivalence and the circular movements 
people engage in responding to it.
Resistance to change in the management literature was 
just a decade ago presented as a simple concept; mostly as a 
metaphor derived from the natural sciences, in particular 
Newtonian physics, with a clear linear causal pattern, in 
which “every primary action has an equal and opposite reac-
tion” (Fleming, 2005, p. 48). For example, the word “change” 
itself triggers emotional reactions (Cartwright, 1951, p. 381), 
as in response to “the fallacy of programmatic change” (Beer, 
Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990, p. 159), as a response to the 
threat of the status quo (Carly Fiorina, 2007 at www.youtube.
com/watch?v=w3IbKbDhfKw), as a response to the threat of 
established relationships within the group (Lawrence, 1969), 
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Abstract
In this essay, we will explore a question which is widely recognized in the world of practitioners of change and which seems 
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and as a response to a threat of personal feelings or the way 
people make sense of the world (Ford, Ford, & McNamara, 
2002). Looking through recent management literature, we 
see, in general, two shifts in the conceptualization of “resis-
tance.” First, a shift from a simple one-dimensional concept 
to a more complex multidimensional concept (Szabla, 2007), 
including a broad array of interactional factors that occur at 
more than one level (Holt & Vardaman, 2013). Second, that 
from a physical phenomenon with a negative connotation to 
a more identity-based social phenomenon (Fleming, 2005; 
Mahadevan, 2012), with a positive connotation in which 
“resistance” no longer is seen as representing a hindrance, 
but even integral to successful change (Ford & Fedor, 2009, 
p. 31; Thomas, Sargent, & Hardy, 2011, p. 23).
When we cannot make a choice between two or more con-
tradictions, because both contradictory perspectives are 
acceptable and present, it can become a paradox (Cameron, 
1986,; Peters, 2012). Or, for that matter, it can become a typi-
cal catch-22 situation in which the only solution is denied by 
a circumstance inherent in the same situation (Burhans, 
1973). What the mind seemingly cannot think, it must think; 
what reason is reluctant to express, it must express. In these 
kinds of ambiguous contexts, we find ourselves in a blurry 
situation, not able to name or see the contradiction itself. We 
become more and more tense as we realize ourselves that we 
are in a situation we don’t want to be in and don’t see our 
way out of it without the help of others. Not to mention the 
fact that we don’t seem to have the capacity to combine or 
integrate the different perspectives relevant for making prog-
ress in these kinds of ambiguous situations. In spite of this, it 
is much argued in the strategic management literature that 
success over time is rooted in adopting a “both/and” 
approach—and by doing so becoming ambidextrous (e.g., 
Smith, Binns, & Tushman, 2010, p. 449). However, we tend 
to agree with Tushman (cited in Seong, Kim, & Szulanski, 
2015) that you can’t do ambidexterity by yourself alone. 
Managing strategic paradoxes simultaneously with a senior 
team is a completely different thing to handling straightfor-
ward ambiguous situations as an individual. Confronted with 
paradoxes simultaneously is, as we see it, for the most of us, 
like driving in a car punching the gas and hitting the brakes 
at the same time, and as a consequence spinning around in a 
circle, producing a lot of noise and smoke while you don’t 
get an inch forward. A phenomenon that has all the same 
ingredients as that of the story of the Red Queen running as 
hard as she can around a tree to stay at the same place in 
Lewis Carroll’s well-known novella, Through the Looking 
Glass.
In his lecture The Perception of Change at Oxford in 
1911, Nobel prize winner Henri Bergson (1946) mentioned,
The point is that usually we look at change but we do not see it. 
We speak of change, but we do not think it. We say that change 
exists, that everything changes, that change is the very law of 
things: yes, we say it and we repeat it; but those are only words, 
and we reason and philosophize as though change does not exist. 
(p. 131)
As we shall describe in the examples further on, in 
response to a change initiative, an urgent request or a life-
threatening message, you can see people putting a lot of 
effort into a lot of things, even perceiving progression, but at 
the same time, there is none. Moreover, action and motion 
are conditional terms for change to be seen, but aren’t in 
themselves sufficient to be sure that change is in the making. 
Much depends on what we perceive as change. Seemingly, 
much depends on what we perceive as real. Or, as Bergson 
(1946, as cited by Tsoukas & Chia, 2002) advises us, “Only 
a direct perception of reality will enable one to get a glimpse 
of its most salient characteristics—its constantly changing 
texture, its indivisible continuity, the conflux of the same 
with the different over time” (p. 571). Interesting in this 
regard is one of Lewin and Grabbe’s (1948) premises “that 
what exists as a reality for the individual is, to a high degree, 
determined by what is socially accepted as a reality within 
the total social setting” (p. 57). It makes clear that only by 
anchoring a person’s own conduct in something as large and 
super-individual as the whole social setting, can individuals 
stabilize new beliefs sufficiently to keep them immune from 
the day-to-day fluctuations of moods and influences to which 
they are subjected (Van Nistelrooij & Sminia, 2010). These 
remarks stress the importance of active participation, sharing 
meaning, and interactive and collective sensemaking pro-
cesses in organizations. If we are to understand how change 
recipients respond to change initiatives, we need to examine 
the kind of processes through which people work to under-
stand issues or events that are novel, ambiguous, confusing, 
or in some other way, violate expectations (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014).
Organizational life is full of moments of ambiguity and 
uncertainty, and the notion of sensemaking has gained wide-
spread traction and become a critically important topic in the 
study of organizations (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). 
According to these authors, sensemaking is the process 
through which individuals seek to clarify what is going on 
when they encounter moments of ambiguity or uncertainty 
(Balogun, 2006). With this kind of definitions, making sense 
of one’s context seems to be a cognitive and conscious pro-
cess. Apparently, we humans seek “sense” by extracting and 
interpreting cues from our environment, using these as the 
basis for a plausible account that provides order that “makes 
sense” (Maitlis, 2005, p. 21). However, without knowing it, 
our conscious way of looking at cues is in itself limited and 
contaminated by, for example, our earlier experiences, edu-
cation, relationships with relevant others, the (changing) 
context we are in, but most of all by all kinds of unconscious 
social perception processes (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, & Smith, 
2005; Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998; Festinger, 
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Schachter, & Back, 1950; Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 
2011). We tend to agree with Tsoukas and Chia (2002) that
change is the reweaving of actors’ webs of beliefs and habits of 
action as a result of new experiences obtained through 
interactions. Insofar as this is an ongoing process, that is, to the 
extent actors try to make sense of and act coherently in the 
world, change is inherent in human action. (p. 570)
So, framing sensemaking as solely cognitive and con-
scious or even as a pure individual process, focused on seek-
ing, appraisal, and interpretation, described in terms of 
developing frameworks, schemata, or mental models, doesn’t 
serve the purpose of this essay.
When we acknowledge that we humans have the capacity 
for shared meanings or symbolic action (Balogun & Johnson, 
2005), we also have to accept that we humans are able to 
interactively mediate behavioral outcomes perceived as 
adaptive, new, and at the same time as “new wine into old 
wineskins,” and as “moving around in circles” (p. 1575). 
Change is always a question of what changes and what stays 
the same. Or for example, as a popular French saying says, 
“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” meaning that the 
more things change, the more things stay the same. The key 
is to see change as having both component issues and forces, 
what changes and what stays the same, rather than just 
change alone. With this, we like to stress the importance of 
approaching change from a whole, which is a notion coming 
from the gestalt, systemic, and cybernetic sciences (Atwater, 
Kannan, & Stephens, 2008; B. G. Hanson, 1995). Looking 
from a whole means that we are more focused on the ongoing 
dynamics and behavioral patterns between parts in a given 
context than the characteristics of the parts themselves. 
Moreover, it also means that we move away from the notion 
that a human is merely a simple point for relaying stimuli 
into responses, and that we instead take a more fine-mazed 
point of view by interconnecting perceptive and manifest 
behavioral patterns. Furthermore, with a more holistic or 
cybernetic approach, we aren’t only looking into the change 
content or the change process but also into the change con-
text and the influence it has on sensemaking (Lockett, Currie, 
Martin, & Waring, 2014). So, what we are saying here is, if 
you are looking at change, much depends on your own per-
spective; do you see the whole or just a part of it? Or to put it 
in other words, “when you look at change do you see people, 
their behaviors, their relations, or all these aspects at once—
as interrelated parts of a whole?”
Looking from a holistic or cybernetic perspective means 
that we look specifically at how outcomes are fed back to the 
performing whole—which can be a group of people, an ech-
elon, an organization, or even a network of organizations. 
What belongs to such a whole and what not is mostly deter-
mined by a shared purpose, the intensity of the interconnect-
edness of the parts (i.e., interdependency), and the way it 
behaves differently from the rest. Feedback is in this regard 
more than “a report given back,” but is about news (con-
veyed as a “difference”) that made a subsequent “difference” 
in a future conduct (Keeney, 2007, p. 886). With this, a 
cybernetic perspective brings into the change literature a 
paradigmatic shift from a lineal to a circular causality 
(Atwater et al., 2008; Foster-Fishman, Nowell, & Yang, 
2007). As pointed out by Keeney (2007), “as Bateson and 
other founding cyberneticians considered the image of a cir-
cle, they became aware that what they were considering was 
more akin to an Ouroboros, the mythical snake that swal-
lowed its own tail” (p. 887). In short, every time events go 
around in a circle, like the Red Queen around the tree, the 
circle stays inside the whole, so although it seems to be a dif-
ference (the feedback from the first outcome), the whole 
doesn’t change. This circular process of “digestion” can 
probably best be compared with the concept of recursion 
from the strategic management literature (e.g., Jarzabkowski, 
2004). In cybernetics, recursive processes are circularly 
organized loops that feedback the whole of themselves, 
thereby maintaining their integrity/autonomy, while the con-
text of the whole does change.
With this approach, we try to emphasize the circular and 
recursive nature of change processes through which people 
seem to do lots of things, but mostly unconsciously, stopping 
themselves changing or learning and by doing so preventing 
change from happening. We shall elaborate on these insights 
later. First, we describe four examples, which for us were the 
starting point for digging into the literature for examples of 
human mechanisms and theoretical concepts that might give 
some kind of explanation of the ambivalent behavior in these 
examples. This search brings us to a renewed acquaintance 
with fields such as communication systems therapy 
(Watzlawick, 1978, 1990), organizational psychology (E. M. 
Hanson, 2002), and cybernetic therapy (Keeney, 2007; 
O’Hanlon & Wilk, 1987). This results in the formulation of 
the following questions that we want to explore in this essay:
1. What is happening when there is much enthusiasm 
about a change initiative and a great deal of knowl-
edge about what to do to change, but nothing seems 
to happen?
2. By exploring specialized literature on ambivalent and 
circular social behavior, what is explained by the 
underlying mechanisms that are often mislabeled as 
“resistance?”
We start with four examples that illustrate the above 
discussion.
Example 1.
Each of us is very well aware of the fact that smoking is very 
dangerous to health and that it causes life-threatening dis-
eases. We are also very well aware that being overweight 
might also cause serious disease. And we know that sport is 
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very beneficial for the body, mind, and health. But to move 
from that awareness and knowledge to real action is very dif-
ficult for almost everybody. Sometimes we succeed in mov-
ing into action for a certain period of time. That costs a lot of 
effort. But what seems to be even more difficult is to main-
tain the change after a while. That seems to be too much for 
many of us.
Example 2.
Another example is given in the comparative medical study 
by Darr, Astin, and Atkin (2008), which shows that only one 
out of seven people with life-threatening heart problems 
actually does anything to change his or her lifestyle. They do 
not lack a sense of urgency, as Kegan and Lahey (2009) 
underlined. The incentives for change of behavior in these 
research cases could not be greater. How can a goal as com-
pelling as “I want to stay alive” possibly conflict with any-
thing else?
Example 3.
A union officer is mostly an independent operating profes-
sional—working with a certain ideology and using their own 
methods, focused on representing, facilitating, emancipat-
ing, and empowering union members. For a union to be suc-
cessful, it is important to have enough members who are 
satisfied with the services offered by their union representa-
tives. Confronted with a continuous decrease in the number 
of members in the last 3 years, a business manager of a union 
expected the employees to become more accountable in 
delivering union services, recruiting members, and realizing 
strategic targets over the next 2 years. During several interac-
tive sessions, union officers, team leaders, managers, and 
administrative staff members discussed the urgency of these 
measures and the best way they could be implemented. After 
2 years, it became clear that nothing had changed for the bet-
ter; in fact, nothing happened at all, and members are still 
leaving their union in substantial numbers. It became clear 
that in a worst-case scenario, there would be no union mem-
bers left to work for. But what could be done? All those 
involved were well aware of the urgency of their situation. 
Everybody was eager to do something and really wanted to 
change the way the union operates. But, instead of pulling 
together to cope with the challenges, people went on with 
their own idiosyncratic ways of working, did not find ways 
to act accordingly, and opposed each other’s ideas for change.
Example 4.
A business school that specialized in offering MBA educa-
tion and in-company management development programs 
had just survived severe cutbacks in which half the staff lost 
their jobs. In the following months, the remaining employ-
ees, who successfully applied for their current upgraded jobs, 
did not seem to manage the daily challenges and opportuni-
ties. Moreover, they did not seem to cope at all. Despite some 
incidental positive national media exposure, everything—
sales, turnover, cash flow, and morale—seemed to decline 
and to accelerate in a downward spiral. In short, during 
monthly gatherings, the CEO briefed his staff on the exact 
financial figures so that everyone knew that it was essential 
to get things done for the survival of the business school as a 
whole. After more than 6 months of unproductive behavior 
and internal dissatisfaction, the CEO decided that something 
drastic had to be done and hired an external specialist to 
boost morale and bring staff into line with the new strategic 
targets. In a series of individual interviews, it became clear 
that everybody was well aware of the urgent financial situa-
tion. It also became clear that the majority of employees 
were struggling with impressions and perceptions of how 
things went during the cutbacks and the following period of 
reapplication. There was, in general, a sense of injustice 
about how things were done, a certain amount of disappoint-
ment in the way the CEO had managed things during the 
transition period, and, in some specific cases, people dis-
played strong emotions toward each other. Despite all this, 
most of the interviewees also seemed to know exactly what 
had to be done. During an interactive large group interven-
tion, the problems, results, and suggestions for the follow-up 
were talked through and validated with the entire staff. 
Although there was much agreement on the main points, 
there was a lack of agreement on the specifics. To cope with 
this, a procedure was agreed on with the employees’ council. 
A small and well-composed group that represented all the 
existing functions and that also included members of the 
employees’ council worked out the outcomes in further detail 
and gave the CEO clear and specific advice about what to do. 
The CEO copy-pasted this advice and presented it back to 
the employees’ council, which gave—to the complete and 
utter surprise of the CEO—negative advice, disapproved the 
proposals made by the CEO, and questioned his competence 
to implement the decisions. This led to new disputes within 
the organization and the whole process came (again) to a 
halt.
In our view, these examples shed a clear light on our basic 
questions for this essay. If people cannot make the changes 
they want, when their lives are on the line, how can we 
expect organization members at any level and in any kind of 
organization to successfully change something as relatively 
trivial as the way they do their job? As Kegan and Lahey 
(2009) concluded,
The change challenges, that today’s leaders and their employees 
face, are not, for the most part, a problem of will. The problem 
is the inability to close the gap between what we genuinely, even 
passionately, want and what we are actually able to do. (p. 2)
We do not act on what we know is clearly in our own best 
interests. Something blocks us or prevents us from moving 
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into action. Much seems to be hidden or subconscious or is 
completely embedded in the linear way we perceive things, 
how we look at ourselves and interact with others.
After these examples, we describe some mechanisms and 
concepts we found in the process-systemic approaches to 
change, which give an understanding of the paradoxical 
nature of the situations we set out in the examples. After this, 
we explore why we cannot label these situations as typical 
examples of “resistance.” We will see that “resistance” as it 
is presented in the change literature is inadequate as an 
explanation for what is happening. By exchanging the “man-
agement” or “interventionst” perspective for that of the 
change recipient, in the section “The Change Recipient, the 
Role of Perception, and Belief Systems,” we try to empha-
size the pivotal role of (social) perception and belief systems. 
In the concluding section, we will present conclusions and 
ideas for further discussion.
What Is Happening and How Are 
These Mechanisms Labeled in the 
Specialized Literature?
In this section, we describe the concepts that we have found 
in the literature that give us a different kind of perspective on 
what is happening when change is wanted and nothing 
happens.
Contradictions and Paradoxes Are Part of Reality
“Major change programs are rife with inner contradictions.” 
By this, Argyris (1998) stated that even when change pro-
grams are implemented correctly, they do not—and cannot—
foster the behavior they are meant to inspire. Programmed 
processes, even the ones that are designed to stimulate 
empowerment, are in fact programs that define employees’ 
actions almost exclusively from the outside. According to 
Argyris, the resulting behavior cannot be empowering and 
liberating. “Do your own thing, the way we tell you.” In 
Argyris’ opinion, these kinds of contradictions need to be 
brought to the surface and addressed to be dealt with suc-
cessfully. If they are not, they will inhibit the kind of per-
sonal commitment that management says it wants.
Contradictions aren’t always seen to be so inhibiting for 
change and development. Moreover, as argued by Cameron 
(1986), more generally, contradictions are a sine qua non for 
organizations to be effective. It is healthy to have attributes 
that are simultaneously contradictory. Furthermore, contra-
dictions are not only food for thought, as Bateson (1979) 
argued, but in fact, also food for change. To adapt, develop, 
and progress, we need opposing perspectives. Or, as Cameron 
(1986, p. 545) puts it, “these contradictory perspectives are 
equally necessary to convey a more imposing, illuminating, 
life-related or provocative insight into truth than either factor 
can muster in its own right.” In a recent study on decision 
making by senior management teams, Smith (2014) con-
cluded that managing paradoxical tensions was reflected in 
the pattern of decisions over time, rather than each individual 
decision. She describes this pattern as a “consistently incon-
sistent” pattern of decision making or “dynamic decision-
making” to capture the flexibility of support for exploration 
and exploitation.
A paradox can be seen as a construct where elements of 
our thoughts, actions, or emotions that seem logical when 
considered in isolation are juxtaposed, appearing mutually 
exclusive. An individual who holds two or more contradic-
tory beliefs, ideas, or values at the same time is experiencing 
mental stress and discomfort, an experience that is labeled by 
Festinger (1962) as “cognitive dissonance.” This stress and 
discomfort may also arise within an individual who holds a 
belief and performs a contradictory action or reaction. 
According to Festinger, the stress is a source for motivation 
in trying to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. 
And by doing this, the individual will actively avoid situa-
tions and information that would likely increase the disso-
nance. The result is often an experience of absurdity or 
paralysis (Luscher, Lewis, & Ingram, 2006). One sees con-
tradicting values, which one seems unable to reconcile. 
However, gradually, one might see that both aspects of the 
paradox are needed, because they need one another to be able 
to exist. Choosing one or the other will have negative effects. 
Seeing and coping with paradox seem to be, as it is with con-
tradictions, a way of looking differently at the situation at 
hand. For example, instead of looking at the situation as 
“either . . . or . . . ,” it can also be “ . . . and . . . and . . . .” Put 
this way, coping with contradictions and paradoxes seems 
just a way of reframing, with a central role for perception. 
But it can also be seen as more of a condition sine qua non 
for change to emerge, as suggested by Seo and Creed (2002).
In the view of Seo and Creed, contradiction and paradox 
can be seen as a common feature at the core of social change. 
From this viewpoint, it seems that getting stuck in a contra-
diction or paradox is just a functional phase, a kind of prereq-
uisite for motivating people to engage in new interactions. 
Change emerges because paradoxes are in fact the tensions 
that motivate and mobilize actors to create new interaction 
patterns that subsequently are embedded in our interaction or 
are institutionalized. Nonetheless, regarding our examples, it 
doesn’t seem that contradictions and paradoxes are the moti-
vational factor in all cases as the next mechanism shows.
Pocket Veto
This term originates from the political sciences. It describes 
the right of the president of the United States not to approve 
a bill that has already been passed by Congress, by not sign-
ing it into law. The president can put it, metaphorically 
speaking, in his back pocket until the time for approving the 
bill has expired. Congress is aware of this and has no choice 
 at Vumc - Bibliotheek on March 29, 2016jmi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
158 Journal of Management Inquiry 25(2)
but to accept this prerogative. E. M. Hanson (2002) used this 
term to describe the power that (for instance) professionals 
have when changes or innovations are introduced: “The 
power is exerted through inaction; in other words: the profes-
sionals simply do not respond to requests or mandates for 
change” (p. 97). Pocket vetoes come to the surface in situa-
tions of pressure, top-down decisions, and hierarchy. When 
you force people to do things they do not believe in, they will 
learn to use the pocket veto. It can be pressure by an indi-
vidual manager or by a group in a department. Managers 
often see pocket vetoes as sabotage: People do not want to do 
what they are asking. From the standpoint of an employee, 
pocket veto is more a way of surviving an unfriendly envi-
ronment, a wish that is not taken seriously or something one 
should not be asked. The employee is then able to do what he 
or she really believes is the right thing to do. Pocket veto is 
in many cases not a conscious act. It emerges as a self-evi-
dent act in line with unconscious beliefs and assumptions: “I 
do not do this or believe this” or “This is not a good thing to 
do,” “My boss is only a human being and he has not got this 
right.” Managers can create pocket vetoes in just minutes. To 
get rid of them might take months. The serious point of 
pocket veto is that it clogs up communication channels, espe-
cially from bottom to top. Only unimportant matters are in 
those channels. And a big wall might develop between the 
upper management layer and the shop floor.
Competing Commitment
According to Kegan and Lahey (2001), many people are 
unwittingly applying productive energy toward a hidden 
competing commitment. The resulting dynamic equilibrium 
stalls the effort in what looks like resistance but is in fact a 
kind of personal immunity to change. These competing com-
mitments are strongly connected to underlying assumptions, 
which are woven into the very fabric of people’s existence. 
These assumptions are often formed long ago and seldom, if 
ever, critically examined; and in fact, people rarely realize 
they hold these assumptions because, quite simply, they 
accept them as reality (Kegan & Lahey, 2001). The authors 
suggest that these assumptions reflect the very human man-
ner in which we invent or shape a picture of the world. These 
pictures, representations of the world as we perceive it, cre-
ate a disarming and deluding sense of certainty. The authors 
suggest that we stop testing these representations once we 
reach adulthood. But the authors ask themselves “how can 
we be sure that our maps do match the territory?” Letting go 
of this certainty is for many of us quite an impossible task. 
The approach of Kegan and Lahey is based on the big idea 
that competing commitments are sustained by assumptions, 
and that these assumptions form the entrance to a three-stage 
change process. The process itself is mainly a chain of one-
on-one interventions based on (a) identifying individuals’ 
competing commitments—let them make a self-disclosing 
statement about it; (b) getting clarification and recognition 
by the owner on the underlying assumption; and (c) taking 
some immediate action to overcome their immunity.
Double Bind
In essence, a double bind happens in a situation in which (a) 
the individual, in most cases, the change message recipient, 
is involved in an intense relationship in which he or she feels 
he or she must get the communication right; (b) the other 
party, mostly the communicator, is expressing two levels of 
messages, in which one message denies the other; and (c) the 
change recipient is unable to comment on the contradiction, 
that is, he or she is unable to make “meta-communicative 
statements” that might help to resolve the mess. These ingre-
dients, endlessly replayed, result on a micro level in an indi-
vidual becoming inactive, on a meso-level in groups 
becoming fully dysfunctional, and on a macro level a whole 
organization becoming non-responsive to change. A “double 
bind” is developed as a result of repeated contradictory mes-
sages, recurring conflicting social perceptions, and conflict-
ing commitments within and between individuals and groups 
(Sluzki & Ransom, 1976). These messages for a double bind 
are mostly sent on different levels of abstraction and can be 
stated implicitly within the context of the situation, or con-
veyed by tone of voice or body language (Bateson, 1976). 
Based on his research at the Palo Alto institute, Bateson and 
his colleagues suggest that double binds are often utilized as 
a form of control without open coercion—the paradox itself 
makes them difficult to respond to or resist. It creates a situ-
ation in which a successful response to one message results 
in a failed response to the other (and vice versa), so that the 
person will be automatically wrong regardless of the 
response. The following are examples of sentences that cre-
ate competing commitments from the side of the change 
communicator—the sentence by Argyris cited earlier: “Do 
your own thing—the way we tell you”; “You must be more 
spontaneous”; “We must have open communication”; “You 
will learn this, when you are doing it”; and “I will tell you 
how we can work together.” The double bind occurs when 
the person cannot confront the inherent dilemma, and there-
fore cannot resolve it or opt out of the situation. This means 
that people can experience contradictions and other difficul-
ties in assigning the correct communicational mode to the 
message they receive. Moreover, it also means that people 
can experience contradictions, even subconsciously, when 
assigning the correct communicational mode to their own 
beliefs, perceptions, and emotions. And all this worsens 
when they find themselves in a position in which it seems 
impossible to act on the perceived contradiction, either by 
acting or communicating on it, or by leaving the field of 
interaction. That is why—without adequate interventions—a 
double bind can be very emotionally distressing for everyone 
involved.
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The Process of Behavior Oscillation
That physical and mental processes interact and form inextri-
cable behavior patterns is the primordial idea that gave birth 
to cybernetics (Keeney, 1983). Behavior oscillation is a 
cybernetic term originally referring to the characteristic 
symptom of negative feedback structures in social systems in 
which the information used to take goal-seeking action is 
delayed. In such cases, a control action is not based on the 
current state of a group of people but on some previous state 
or value. Using dated information to control the approach to 
a change target is likely to cause the group to miss or over-
shoot its goal. When a social system—let’s say the whole 
group of participants—is caught in a feedback loop in which 
the corrective behaviors overshoot, its action will also appear 
to wildly oscillate (Keeney, 1983).
For example, employees may be troubled by incoherent, 
ambiguous, unclear, or double bind messages that the com-
pany is going to be restructured in the near future. Although 
a manager responds by complaining that he is not able to 
realize successfully the intended change because of the 
“resistance” of the employees, one implication is that the 
symptoms he perceives serve to protect him from being too 
direct and pushy and having the risk of becoming disliked by 
the employees, something he is secretly (or unconsciously) 
nervous about. When this nervousness (or anxiety), for 
example, about being accepted by the group of employees, 
calms down, the employees begin to do things as if nothing 
happened and stay inactive. This then results in the manager 
having an anxiety episode—for example, by the thought that 
he will be the only one not realizing the change targets as 
they were set for the whole organization. This then can result 
in overachieving and straightforward interventions by the 
manager, triggering the actual blocking of the change by the 
employees.
People don’t always see that they are interdependent of 
each other in realizing shared goals, interpersonal communi-
cations, which in itself can bring endemic episodes of social 
disorganization. Any focus of patterned interpersonal rela-
tionships in such a setting can be observed to oscillate 
between states of more harmonious functioning and states of 
greater discord. The frequency and intensity of these oscilla-
tions are determined, hypothetically, by the degree to which 
individuals are susceptible to disturbance, because of per-
sonal instabilities, the degree to which permissiveness is 
exercised, and the degree to which the social structure fosters 
interpersonal “contagion,” that is, “feedback” of communi-
cations. Deviant behavior and the accompanying social dis-
organization within this framework are attended by 
intrapersonal and interpersonal tensions. These tension states 
need not be seen as destructive and therefore categorically to 
be avoided. On the contrary, they may have constructive and 
even therapeutic value (Rapoport, 1956).
How Can We Understand the 
Mechanisms Labeled “Resistance?”
Resistance is mostly seen as manifest and conscious behav-
ior within a given social context that, according to a series of 
publications (Ileris, 2004; Piderit, 2000; Prochaska, Norcross, 
& Diclemente, 1994; Szabla, 2007), refers to interconnec-
tions between cognitive, emotional, and attitudinal compo-
nents. In this section, we reflect on some of the key ideas on 
resistance, which seem to be—in the light of our previous 
examples and arguments—taken for granted.
Resistance Is More Than an Outcome of a 
Rational and Predictable Process
The notion of resistance to change can be credited to Kurt 
Lewin. According to his biographer, friend, and PhD student 
Alfred Marrow (1969), Lewin evolved this concept “based 
on the ‘person’ as a complex energy field in which all behav-
iour could be conceived of as a change in some state of a 
field” (p. 30). This way of looking at personal behavior in a 
certain context seems to fit remarkably well with our exam-
ples and arguments. It is almost a shame that we scholars 
seem to have lost this point of view in the way we conceptu-
alize “resistance.” For a typical example of this, we refer to 
the classic literature on planned change (Azjen, 1988; 
Fishbein & Azjen, 1975). Their point of view is that change 
is based on the assumption that the intention to engage in a 
new particular behavior is the result of a rational linear pro-
cess that is goal-oriented, as shown in Figure 1.
As presented in Figure 1, change in the traditional planned 
behavior models follows a one-dimensional logical sequence 
from cognition/emotion, attitude, via intention to changed 
behavior (Gibbons, Gerrard, Blanton, & Russell, 1998). This 
concept seems far too simplistic. As Lewin already stated in the 
1940s, “If all three of these (cognitions, emotions, attitudes)—
and the processes which give rise to them—were governed by 
the same laws, change itself would be much simpler” (Lewin & 
Grabbe, 1948, p. 59). Lord and Levy (1994); Johnson, Chang, 
and Lord (2006); and Douglas et al. (2008) showed in their 
studies that all three—cognitions, emotions, and attitudes—
have in their own respect different characteristics, different 
processing speeds, and different behavior-influencing capabili-
ties. They are based on different types of human processing. 
Figure 1. Classic conception of planned behavior models.
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Unfortunately, for people who like to plan, plot, and predict 
human behavior, change is not simple. As a consequence, the 
way people react is less certain and, as our examples and 
concepts from the literature show, far more unpredictable, as 
suggested by the sequences in the classic planned behavior 
models.
Resistance Is More Than an Attitude Toward 
Change
One of the early experiments of Asch (1940) showed that the 
primary process in influence is not change in attitudes toward 
an object but rather change in the definition and psychologi-
cal meaning of the object. Based on these and other findings, 
it may be presumed that when psychological meaning 
changes, attitudes change accordingly (Wood, 2000). 
Moreover, people do not resist change per se. Or, as Dent and 
Goldberg (1999) argued, people may resist loss of status, loss 
of pay, or loss of comfort, but this felt loss is not the same as 
resisting change. Resistance to change does not per se reflect 
a physical blockade or tangible opposition, as proposed by 
Kotter (1995); it is more a result of internal and social per-
ception processes. Lewin and Grabbe (1948) originally pos-
tulated that “social action no less than physical action is 
steered by social perception” (p. 61). If we grasp an object, 
the movement of our hand is steered by its perceived position 
in the perceived surroundings. Likewise, as Lewin and 
Grabbe stated, our social behaviors are steered by the posi-
tion in which we perceive ourselves and relevant others 
within the total setting. For example, the experiments by 
Asch in the early 1940s dealing with perception and (per-
ceived) group pressure on individual group members show 
what exists as “reality” for the individual is, to a large degree, 
determined by what he or she perceives as being socially 
accepted as reality. Human beings continuously construct 
and deconstruct mental images of their surroundings, trans-
lating these, accumulating knowledge, comparing, and inte-
grating them with already existing knowledge, images, and 
beliefs. The way people perceive their world is, in fact, a 
mental construct, deeply embedded and based on experi-
ences, education, and other impulses. These mental models 
create a disarming and deluding sense of certainty, and for 
us, they are the reality that is automatically molding our 
everyday behavior (Dent & Goldberg, 1999).
Gersick (1991) taught us that the uncertainty that is inher-
ent in periods of change fosters divergent thinking around 
which a new cognitive structure can crystallize; after a while, 
“things fall into place.” This point of view is supported by 
the study of Isabella (1990). She found that managers evolve 
through a four-stage model of interpretation, going from a 
disorganized frame to a well-constructed evaluative frame at 
the end of the change period. In addition, Boulding (1988) 
has suggested that inappropriate mental models are one of 
the primary factors causing organizational dysfunction today. 
This can eventually threaten the survival of some organiza-
tions. Argyris (1990) argued that most people can identify 
the counterproductive actions other people cause, but at the 
same time, they seem to experience difficulty in perceiving 
their own actions as counterproductive or identify those 
actions as “resistance” (p. 13). The absence of this kind of 
self-reflective capacity can have an escalating effect on the 
intensity of the “resistance” people develop.
Resistance Is More Than a Conscious State of 
Mind
As Wood (2000) concluded, attitudes are social phenomena, 
which emerge from and are embedded in social interaction. 
This is an important link in interpreting resistance and cop-
ing with it. And, as such, the link is strangely enough com-
pletely absent in the classic planned behavior models. 
Moreover, we think that these components are intertwined 
with each other, and that, as a result, the outcome in terms of 
new behaviors is not only much less predictable but also far 
more diffuse and inconsistent. As Chin and Benne (1976) 
argued, changes in patterns of action are believed to be the 
consequence of alterations in normative structures such as 
assumptions and beliefs, in roles and relationships as well as 
in perceptual orientations. Changes in attitude alone will not 
result in new behavioral patterns unless there is also some 
change achieved in deeper structures such as beliefs and 
assumptions and in perceptions of the self and the situation. 
Recently, Elias (2009) showed that our beliefs and attitudes 
are linked with our subconscious assumptions and are, in 
general, the starting point for a positive or negative evalua-
tive judgment. According to Kegan and Lahey (2001), 
assumptions play a pivotal role in a learning process, in 
which we test mental representations of what we think works 
in a given situation. According to them, it seems to be a cir-
cular, interactive relation; many of our representations, per-
ceptions, and commitments are sustained by the same 
assumptions. So that what looks like resistance is, in fact, an 
automatic response or learned conditioned behavior.
Some decades earlier, Douglas McGregor (1960) illus-
trated that beliefs are in most cases implicit, sometimes quite 
unconscious, and often conflicting. But they nevertheless 
determine our predictions that if we do a, b will occur. 
Human behavior is, as McGregor saw it, predictable, but, as 
in physical science, accurate prediction hinges on the cor-
rectness of underlying beliefs and assumptions. The same 
point is made later on by Argyris (1990), who stated that 
people hold assumptions, and that we make inferences from 
them about our surroundings (the territory). Furthermore, in 
his many years working with managers, McGregor (1960) 
observed that the common practice of proceeding without 
explicit examination of assumptions leads, at times, to 
remarkable inconsistencies in human behavior. People rarely 
realize they hold assumptions. Moreover, some people, such 
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as Senge (1990), are convinced that these assumptions are so 
deeply embedded that people do not even realize that they 
imply simplified models of reality. For them, they are the 
reality. As a result, without knowing it consciously, they are 
woven into the very fabric of our existence. Mostly formed 
during childhood and adolescence, we stop critically exam-
ining them as we enter into adulthood (Kegan & Lahey, 
2001). Without consciously knowing, we accept our assump-
tions about the world as a given and self-evident reality. But 
these assumptions are in fact a map, a navigation tool, and 
not the territory itself in which we live. Without testing to be 
sure whether they still work in a given situation, assumptions 
become obsolete and will induce behavior that is not ade-
quate for the continuously changing surroundings. Argyris 
(1990) argued that, whenever human beings are faced with 
the kinds of inadequacies that contain significant embarrass-
ment, anxiety, or threat, the basic strategy involves bypass 
and cover-up. When other people in the same organization 
use these actions, the actions become the actual behavior 
manifested, which become organizational norms. These 
actions come to be viewed as logical, rational, sensible, and 
realistic, but are, in fact, based on inappropriate assumptions 
that are no longer adequate.
Resistance Is More Than a Linear Response
Change is about shifting interpretations and fine-tuning what 
makes sense, making inferences and recalibrating our 
assumptions. It is mainly an ongoing unconscious process, 
which provides us with different understandings of the world 
around us, based on the way our perception machinery 
works, and which serves as the main trigger for our behavior, 
also influencing our affections and emotions. Inspired by 
Bateson (1979), Tsoukas and Chia (2002) stressed the impor-
tance of perception:
In perception we are responsive to difference, to change. I can 
feel the bump in the road because of the difference between the 
level of the road and the level of the top of the bump. I can see 
that morale in the department has dropped because of the 
difference between how people feel now and the time when the 
department was full of life. The undifferentiated is imperceptible. 
The more sensitive one is to differences, ever more subtle, the 
more perceptive one will be. (p. 571)
On a social interactive level, resistance is about manifest 
behavior, conations, language, coping mechanisms, and 
defense skills that we bring to a given social context. In 
interaction with others, we influence and trigger the percep-
tion processes, emotions, and responses of others. 
Interaction, therefore, enhances our consciousness of our 
behavior, feelings, and our own responses. As a conse-
quence, by all accounts, everyone’s response is circular and 
not linear. What exists as a reality for the individual is, to a 
large degree, determined by what is socially accepted as a 
reality within the total social setting, of which we perceive 
ourselves and others to be part (Van Nistelrooij & Sminia, 
2010). Moreover, how close we feel to other people is an 
important determinant of everyday life social interaction. 
We experience only ourselves, here and now, and anything 
that is not perceived directly is psychologically distant 
(Stephan et al., 2011). Also related to social perception are 
the earlier findings of Festinger et al. (1950), showing that 
spatial proximity increases interpersonal closeness, feel-
ings, and the perception of familiarity and similarity. For 
example, these authors found that people are more likely to 
develop close relationships with residents of nearby apart-
ments than with those who live farther away. Notably, spa-
tial distance between residents in these studies was 
associated with opportunities for exposure, interaction, and 
exchange. More recently, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996); 
Dijksterhuis and Van Knippenberg (1998); and Dijksterhuis 
et al. (2005) demonstrated unconscious and unintentional 
effects of perception on social behavior in a series of studies 
and experiments.
Perceptions are interlinked with deeply ingrained assump-
tions or images (Senge, 1990), which influence how we 
understand the world and how we think about deciding to 
take action in a certain situation. We attempt to visualize this 
premise in Figure 2. Based on this premise, we suspect that a 
change process has to fulfill a task that is essentially equiva-
lent to a change in assumptions, beliefs, cognitions, and 
emotions, and that starts with perception.
As implied in Figure 2, perception is directly connected to 
our deeper structures as well as to the way we give meaning 
to our own social interactive behavior and that of others in a 
given situation. This process of giving meaning to the signals 
in our surroundings is filtered by our beliefs and assump-
tions. In the same way, perception can be conceptualized as 
directly triggering cognitions and emotions in response to 
this process of giving meaning. In the next section, we will 
focus further on the pivotal role of perception, especially 
from the perspective of the change recipient.
Figure 2. Integrated and dynamic concept of resistance.
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The Change Recipient, the Role of 
Perception, and Belief Systems
We try to hold on to who we are. We aim for stability, trying 
to maintain our beliefs, attitudes, and personality. We have a 
mechanism that Kloosterboer (2011) called “dynamic con-
servatism”: This is the inclination to adapt external informa-
tion, impulses, and interventions to our own mental models, 
beliefs, and frames. The mechanism is aimed at keeping any-
thing that is new or different on the outside. To some extent, 
however, change is inevitably an excursion into the unknown. 
It implies, as Menzies-Lyth (1960) pointed out, a commit-
ment to future events that are not entirely predictable and to 
their consequences; it inevitably provokes uncertainty, doubt, 
and anxiety. A group that has learned to hold a common set 
of assumptions perceives, feels, and sees the external world 
in a certain shared way, which generates automatic behavior 
patterns that are typical for this group (Schein, 1990). These 
patterns provide meaning, comfort, order, and ways of cop-
ing with this uncertainty, doubt, and anxiety. Anxiety is likely 
to be more manifest and intense when people perceive the 
changes as having an impact on their social relationships and 
when they feel they are contradictory to the common set of 
assumptions and beliefs. The circular dynamics in a change 
process will be intensified when the change is perceived as 
contradictory to our beliefs and assumptions and the way we 
experience our existing social relationships. We believe that 
resistance to social change can be better understood if it is 
seen as the resistance of groups unconsciously clinging to 
their assumptions and beliefs, because proposed changes 
threaten existing social defenses against deep and intense 
anxieties (see also Jaques, 1955).
Individuals who are not committed to the organization, 
who have distanced themselves, and who have chosen to 
play it safe do not have a serious problem. They find comfort 
and protection in their defensive routines and their conse-
quences (Argyris, 1990; Menzies-Lyth, 1960; Shapiro & 
Carr, 1991). You will not notice any resistance from or with 
these people. The situation is different for individuals who 
genuinely care about organizational performance, who feel 
proud to aspire toward excellence, who are committed, and 
who want to be involved. For them, the intended change 
raises all kinds of internal tensions because, in accepting the 
situation as it is, they are violating their own sense of integ-
rity. How do they live with this violation? One way for indi-
viduals to deal with their pent-up feelings is to redefine 
authority and responsibility (Baum, 1987) in such a way that 
they can change the meaning of these terms whenever they 
are confronted with the possibility that they or others might 
become aware of their shame and guilt. Argyris (1990) called 
this “fancy footwork” (p. 46). It includes actions that permit 
individuals to be blind to inconsistencies in their actions or to 
deny that these inconsistencies even exist; or, if they cannot 
do either, to place the blame on other people. Fancy footwork 
means to use all the defensive reasoning and actions to con-
tinue the distancing and blindness without holding oneself 
responsible.
What blocks us is our own representation and correspond-
ing perception of the social setting we live in. According to 
Argyris (1990), defensive reasoning occurs when individuals 
(a) hold assumptions of which the validity is questionable, 
yet they think it is not; (b) make inferences that do not neces-
sarily follow from the assumptions, yet they do it; and (c) 
reach conclusions that they believe they have tested care-
fully, yet they have not because the way they have been 
framed makes them untestable. Holding these premises and 
believing the inferences are true leads to all sorts of actions 
that bypass and cover-up the causes. The problem is that dis-
cussing these assumptions means eventually letting go of a 
certainty, which is for many of us an absolutely impossible 
task. Revans (1966) used the parable of “The Emperor’s 
Clothes” to point out that people can only interpret their 
emotions and beliefs in the familiar language of what they 
know. We should clear our minds of the clutter and obstruc-
tion that so often we try to pass off as the wisdom of experi-
ence. How difficult this is is well illustrated by B. Harvey’s 
“Abilene paradox” on the Internet (www.youtube.com/
watch?v=z_iGdiYO7gI), which illustrates that groups of 
people can take action contrary to the desires of their mem-
bers, defeating the very purpose they set out to achieve.
Another example that well illustrates what happens when 
people see what they together are doing to each other is given 
by Senge, Scharmer, Jaworski, and Flowers (2004):
After several years of analysis of what was preventing auto 
engineering teams from working together effectively in order to 
meet critical timing targets all the team members were together 
working with so called “causal loop diagrams” or “system 
maps.” As they were analysing they began to see a pattern. 
When a subspecialty team faced a difficult design issue, they 
often had a choice: they could apply a quick fix, or they could 
address the fundamental sources of the problem. Teams could 
implement quick fixes on their own, whereas more fundamental 
solutions often required collaboration among different teams. 
Everyone was under intense time pressure, so quick fixes were 
the norm—unfortunately, often with unrecognised size effects 
for other teams. It was as if they suddenly saw what they all 
knew but didn’t know they knew. All the details were very 
familiar to them—the problems, the reactions, and the strained 
relationships that characterised their work environment. Now 
they were actually seeing the systemic pattern that caused this, 
and they could see that no one individual was to blame. They 
had created this pattern together. Each team did what made 
sense to it, but no one saw the larger system—their individual 
reactions created—a system that consistently produced poor 
technical solutions, stress, and late cars. As the implications of 
the system began to sink in, one of the group members said, “My 
God, look what we’re doing to ourselves!” The key word in this 
statement was “we.” Up to this point, there had been someone to 
blame for every problem: the other teams, their bosses, not 
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enough time. When the “theys” go away and the “we” shows up, 
people’s awareness and capabilities change. (pp. 43-44)
Change is only possible for any of us after we recognize 
our own “clutter and obstructions” and our own perceptual 
limitations. “Redirecting attention towards the source,” as 
Senge et al. (2004) called it, encompasses empathy but goes 
further. Dissolving the boundaries between seer and seen 
leads not only to a deep sense of connection but also to a 
heightened sense of change. What first appeared as fixed or 
even rigid begins to appear more dynamic because we’re 
sensing the reality as it is being created, and we perceive our 
part in creating it. Of course, one must first of all explore to 
some extent one’s own beliefs and assumptions. According 
to Watzlawick (1990), direct questions are of no great help, 
because every description presupposes that one steps outside 
the perceptual frame of that which is to be described. In this 
line of thought, Watzlawick (1990) and after him, Tsoukas 
and Chia (2002) referred to the “fence whitewashing scene” 
(p. 571) from Tom Sawyer as an example of how to break this 
vicious circle. In this scene, the hero is punished by having to 
whitewash a fence on Saturday afternoon while all the other 
boys are free to go swimming. To save face and escape his 
friends’ derision, he reinterprets the whole situation and acts 
as if painting the fence were a rare and highly desirable privi-
lege. This reinterpreting or reframing can be seen as “an 
intervention that constructs a new reality aspect in place of a 
former one, whereby the new aspect fits the new becoming 
situation just as well or better than the old view” (Watzlawick, 
1990, p. 147). If the reframing is successful, it can block the 
often desperate feeling, “I should react, but I cannot.” It is 
not acquiring new information but reinterpreting or recon-
structing the same data. The best way to do this, as we see it, 
is as Schein (1996) puts it: “to discover in a conversational 
process that the interpretation that someone else puts on a 
concept is different from one’s own” (p. 231).
Discussion and Conclusion
Behavior is seldom entirely rational, based on linear, mecha-
nistic assumptions traditionally associated with the physical 
sciences. In fact, it is even possible that the other way around 
is true, that this kind of “rational” conceiving behavior is 
itself the trigger for the actual “spinning around.” Confronted 
with intentional change, human behavior seldom follows a 
simple causal pattern, but more likely, a recursive and itera-
tive one. The essence seems to be not to strive directly to 
pinpoint the deficient behavior and successively try to alter 
it, but to connect with the means and mechanisms by which 
an existing (pattern of) behavior is maintained. Of interest 
here seems also to be the “secondary gain” (Watzlawick, 
Beavin, & Jackson, 1967, p. 29), the perceived benefit—or 
reward—that exists in what for the outsider appears to be (or 
is in fact) dysfunctional behavior.
Let us look at the example of the business school (Example 
4). Because in the eyes of most of the employees the CEO 
was associated with the painful cutbacks, there was a conta-
gion of affect in mistrusting the CEO in his intentions. 
Combined with a lack of understanding of what the desired 
outcomes of the new interventions were, people react impul-
sively to pull themselves back to their individual workplaces 
trying to “mind their own business.” Meanwhile, the process 
of mistrust contaminates not only their relationship with the 
CEO but also the interpersonal relationships with their direct 
colleagues. Although the CEO copy-pasted the text with the 
advice from the employees’ council, the process oscillated 
because there was simply no trust, and in the eyes of the 
members of the council, the suggested solutions didn’t com-
ply to the need for a safe place.
Change is a process that probably can best be understood 
by studying one’s self, to know your own reactions, reflexes, 
assumptions, prejudices, and more, and by doing your own 
emotional homework: Where do my emotional reactions 
come from? How can I understand them? This of course 
applies knowledge and understanding of others. In that sense, 
we have to understand the micro processes in ourselves and 
between people. It is clear that this can only be done in an 
educative way (by yourself and with the help of others). For 
Examples 1 and 2, at the beginning of this essay, that is, as 
we see it, the only effective way out.
It will be helpful when contradictive, oscillating, and cir-
cular behavioral patterns come to the full awareness level of 
the minds of all involved parties, and every one of them sees 
their own part in it. If not, they will reduce performance and 
commitment, stifle development, and breed frustration and 
mistrust, as was the case in, for example, the trade union 
(Example 3). The mechanisms for non-change were in this 
example far stronger than the desire and the urgency to make 
change happen. We think that when people are not aware of 
those mechanisms, change is difficult to realize. Even worse, 
the situation in the union case diminishes the effort people 
put into breaking through their own perceptions and appraisal 
of their surroundings. To do this, “resistance” has to be 
judged on its merits from multiple perspectives, and the 
activities of those who see themselves as resistant subjects 
must be factored into this analysis. But, if people confront 
their own defensive routines to reduce them, there is a risk of 
opening a can of worms because the participants themselves 
probably do not know how to realize such a breakthrough by 
themselves. This will lead to another round of resistance, as 
implied in Figure 2. Reinterpreting and reframing our own 
interpretations can only be done as part of a larger—more 
collective—reinterpretation or reframing process, which 
includes all subjects who have a part in the daily routines you 
want to break through (Van Nistelrooij & Sminia, 2010).
The exchange of interpretations has to be, by all accounts, 
interactive, reciprocal, and multilateral, and will probably be 
iterative, without a neat division between adaptive and 
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regressive behavior. This kind of collective reframing pro-
cess, which involves large numbers of participants, can be 
facilitated by using interactive change methods such as “Open 
Space,” “Future Search,” “Real Time Strategic Change,” 
“World Café,” and “Appreciative Inquiry.” But the point we 
try to make here, as is the case in our Examples 3 and 4, is that 
even these kinds of interactive interventions can fail when 
they do not encourage people to espouse what they see as 
actually happening, or to be frank and open about it. That is, 
what is being espoused should not contradict what actually 
happens. Therefore, it isn’t all about large group interven-
tions; it is about stimulating and continuing micro processes 
between people, asking them the right questions, reflecting on 
the answers from all relevant perspectives, and giving people 
enough space to experiment with the outcomes.
An essential challenge of intervening in another one’s 
process is that it is helpful to create a (temporary) space 
where there are (temporary) rules that facilitate the process 
of inquiry, individual and collective awareness of assump-
tions, and ditto reframing. The strong point of these so-called 
large group interventions is that they can create a new space, 
new relationships between participants, and new rules for the 
interaction and freedom to espouse: a new platform for dia-
logue, to make the awareness and reframing possible. The 
vulnerability lies then of course in the translation and transi-
tion of this experience into daily life. If everything returns to 
the old rules, the familiar space, the existing relationships, 
and the patterns of interaction that existed before, then the 
experience and inquiry are of no value. Here lies an impor-
tant task for the leaders and change agents. They have to play 
two roles: one, being a participant bringing in openly and 
reciprocally their own perspective, and second, being a guide 
facilitating the new “reality” and way of interacting into 
future practice.
Furthermore, we want to recall that we are talking about 
organizational change as a complex, messy, day-to-day 
working practice, rather than a neatly planned organizational 
change program and design. For anyone who wishes to inter-
vene in this kind of circular interaction with the intent to 
facilitate a breakthrough, it is far more realistic to expect that 
people will show certain irregularities, deviations, recur-
rences, and contradictions in their response, which implies 
that inconsistent behavior is a much more natural way to 
respond to a change initiative than we assume. However, a 
thorough understanding of the way in which each of these 
components is affected by any specific step in a change pro-
cess can be helpful in interpreting human response to change.
At the end of this essay, it seems to us that there is a need 
for an interventionist approach devoted to (a) exploring the 
clients’ and consultants’ epistemological assumptions, (b) 
discerning the effect on thought and action of holding those 
assumptions, and (c) deliberately bringing about a shift in 
those assumptions to further outcomes concerning the inter-
action patterns in groups. One of the interventions we know 
of that made this happen was the T-group exercise (Bradford, 
Gibb, & Benne, 1964) “in which each individual learns about 
his own motives, feelings, and strategies in dealing with 
other persons” (p. 2). As Bennis later, in 1969, noted (as cited 
in Burnes & Cooke, 2012), “the values and lessons learnt 
off-site in T-groups did not equip people to deal with the 
political dynamics of organizational life” (p. 7). Consequently, 
as Burns and Cook continue, by the end of the 1960s, the 
influence of T-groups dramatically declined. But, as Ronald 
Lippitt, one of the founding fathers of this method, already 
proclaimed in 1948,
A lot of people have good will about improving human relations 
and intergroup relationships, but nothing very effective seems to 
get accomplished and most of the workers become inactive 
before long . . . Because of the inadequate plan, or because of 
our inadequate skills in putting plans into effect through the 
techniques of influencing others, we bog down, getting apathetic 
responses or strong resistance. Or because our objectives and 
steps of accomplishment are so inadequately defined we go 
along without ever really knowing whether we are making 
progress or not. . . . And so I (the interventionist) begin to 
become less and less active, and more and more inclined 
to make aggressive remarks about “people not being willing to 
co-operate” . . . So it goes, around the circle . . . (pp. 1-2)
In our view, this is the exact reason why it is so important 
not only to understand our own behavior and reactions but 
also to understand group dynamics and to become aware of 
the sometimes subtle differences in individual assumptions 
that are lying just below the surface—restraining our and 
others’ behavior.
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